Marine Transportation Safety Advisory Letter 03/25

August 5, 2025

President and owner
Ovatek Inc.
2256 Industrielle Street
Bas-Caraquet NB  E1W 5Z2

Subject:

Marine Transportation Safety Advisory Letter 03/25 (occurrence M25A0022)
Rigid Life Rafts (Ovatek) Installation on Board Vessels

On February 6, 2025, the fishing vessel Fortune Pride, with 4 people on board, sank off Sambro, Nova Scotia. The crew members were unable to reach the hydrostatic release unit (HRU) on the rigid life raft. All 4 crew members successfully entered the secured 4-person rigid life raft (Ovatek) and activated the vessel’s emergency position-indicating radio beacon. However, they were unable to release the life raft and had to evacuate the life raft as the vessel sank. A Canadian Coast Guard vessel rescued 3 crew members from the water. One of the 3 crew members was pronounced dead at the hospital. The body of the 4th crew member was recovered from the overturned rigid life raft the following morning. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigation into this occurrence (M25A0022) is ongoing.

The TSB may communicate safety issues before an investigation is complete. This communication is undertaken to ensure that those best able to take remedial action and effect change are made aware of safety issues in a timely manner.

The manufacturer’s instructionsInstallation Instructions: Ovatek 4 & Ovatek 7 Rigid Life rafts (14 March 2014). state that the life raft should be installed so that crew members can access the hydrostatic release unit (usually towards the interior of the vessel) and crew can easily access and enter the life raft. The instructions also state that the life raft should be installed so that there is an unobstructed path for throwing the life raft overboard.

The TSB has observed fishing vessels of different types and in different locations where the installation of the rigid life raft appears to deviate from the manufacturer’s instructions. Such installations may lead to difficulties releasing, launching, or boarding the life raft in an emergency.

Figure 1. The HRU is on the exterior of the vessel (A) and there are obstructions to throwing the rigid life raft overboard (B, C). There is limited access for crew members to enter (D) (Source: TSB)
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Figure 1. The HRU is on the exterior of the vessel (A) and there are obstructions to throwing the rigid life raft overboard (B, C). There is limited access for crew members to enter (D) (Source: TSB)
Figure 2. The HRU (circled) is not easily accessible. The rear hatch is not easily accessible to crew members (Source: TSB)
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Figure 2. The HRU (circled) is not easily accessible. The rear hatch is not easily accessible to crew members (Source: TSB)
Figure 3. The hull is damaged (A) and the quick-release mechanism for the HRU (B) cannot be operated manually (Source: TSB)
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Figure 3. The hull is damaged (A) and the quick-release mechanism for the HRU (B) cannot be operated manually (Source: TSB)
Figure 4. Obstructions to throwing the rigid life raft overboard (Source: TSB)
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Figure 4. Obstructions to throwing the rigid life raft overboard (Source: TSB)

Ovatek may wish to consider contacting owners of rigid life rafts to bring their attention to the recommendations for installation. The TSB would appreciate being advised of any action that is taken in this regard. An investigator may follow up with you at a later date.

Upon completion of investigation M25A0022, the Board will release its report into the occurrence.

Yours sincerely,

Original signed by

Marie-Hélène Roy
Acting director, Marine Investigations Branch
Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Cc. Director General, Marine Safety and Security, Transport Canada