On July 23, 2025, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) launched a safety issue investigation (SII) (M24A0348) into shipboard fires on commercial vessels and the effectiveness of emergency response in Canada.
Unlike individual occurrence investigations, an SII is broad in scope, involving an in-depth review of multiple occurrences and consulations with key industry stakeholders.
Why this matters
In the past decade, nearly 400 fires on commercial vessels have been reported to the TSB, with 10% resulting in total vessel loss. Despite the nine safety concerns and 10 recommendations issued by the TSB in the last 35 years, vessel fires continue to endanger crews, disrupt operations, and threaten safety in Canadian waters.
This investigation will explore what crew members and responders understand about fire response, how they handle these events, and Canada’s overall preparedness to respond to them. Given international concern over vessel fire safety, the TSB may also share its findings with the International Maritime Organization, and other global partners.
Areas of focus
The SII will investigate safety issues that have been identified in previous TSB investigations including seafarer knowledge of fixed-fire suppression systems, training in vessel-based fires for shore-based firefighting personnel, and the capacity to fight shipboard fires in Canadian waters.
A survey will be made available to marine operators, firefighting services, ports and harbours, and other key industry stakeholders. The results will be compiled and analyzed along with other data gathered by the investigation to identify recurring gaps and trends.
TSB marine investigations involving fires
| Occurrence number and vessel name | Summary of occurrence and recommendations/safety concerns (if applicable) |
|---|---|
| ZIM Kingston (M21P0297) | Summary: On October 21, 2021, the container vessel ZIM Kingston experienced parametric rolling, which caused the vessel to roll 36° and lose 109 containers overboard. A number of containers on deck were also damaged. Around 36 hours later, while the vessel was anchored off Victoria, BC, a fire broke out in a damaged container then spread to five nearby containers. The fire burned for five days before it was declared extinguished. |
| Safety concern: This occurrence, and many others, have shown that while the Canadian Coast Guard has the capacity to evacuate crew members that are injured or at risk, there are systemic gaps in other aspects of responding to emergencies on vessels. At June 2024, Transport Canada indicated that work to develop these regulations is expected to continue over the next four years, subject to the government’s regulatory priorities. In the interim, the Board is concerned that there are gaps in Canada’s preparedness for marine emergencies that exceed the response capacity of a vessel’s crew, posing a risk to vessels, the environment, and the health and safety of the general public. | |
| Atlantic Destiny (M21A0041) | Summary: On March 2, 2021, the fishing vessel Atlantic Destiny, with 31 people on board, sustained a catastrophic engine failure while the vessel was about 120 nautical miles south of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia. The shaft generators exploded, causing a fire and damage that led to flooding in the engine room. All crew members were evacuated by search and rescue authorities. Minor injuries were reported. On March 3, 2021, the Atlantic Destiny sank. |
| Safety concern: Given several occurrences during which the effectiveness of CO2 was compromised during the fire response, the Board is concerned that there is insufficient crew knowledge of the necessary pre- and post-release stages in the use of CO2 fixed fire suppression systems. | |
| Tecumseh (M19C0403) | Summary: On December 15, 2019, the bulk carrier Tecumseh had a fire in the engine room while transiting the Detroit River off Windsor, Ontario. There were 16 crew members on board at the time. The vessel dropped both anchors, and the fixed fire suppression system was used to extinguish the fire. The fire later re-ignited, and the vessel was towed to the Port of Windsor, where the fire was extinguished on December 16, with the assistance of shore-based resources. |
| Safety concern: The Board believes that shore-based resources must be trained and equipped to respond to major vessel fires in order to minimize the consequences of a fire in the close confines of a port or harbour. Therefore, the Board is concerned that some Canadian ports and harbours authorities may lack the proper equipment, training, and resources to respond effectively to shipboard fires occurring within their jurisdiction, which could result in fires that endanger crews, the general public, property, and the environment. The Board will continue to monitor this issue with a view to assessing the need for further safety action. | |
MOL Prestige (M18P0014)
| Summary: A fire broke out in the engine room of the container vessel MOL Prestige while the vessel was at sea. The fire was eventually extinguished. Five of the crew members were seriously injured. The CO2 system on the MOL Prestige had a dedicated charge of CO2 that was sufficient for a single attempt at extinguishing an engine room fire. Once the trapped crew egressed from the engine room, the master ordered the release of the CO2. However, some of the CO2 cylinders did not release their contents, and the fire in the engine room was not extinguished. The system did not provide any indication or alert to the master that some of the CO2 cylinders had not released their contents, and so the master was not immediately aware that the system had failed. |
Frederike. C-2 (M15C0045)
| Summary: A fire broke out on the fishing vessel Frederike. C-2 shortly after it departed Rimouski, Quebec. The master and the three crew members on board abandoned the vessel using a life raft and were rescued by another fishing vessel. The Frederike. C-2 burned to the waterline and sank. The carbon dioxide (CO2) fixed fire suppression system was activated 20-30 minutes after the fire broke out. The first charge of CO2 was released without performing crucial preliminary steps, particularly ensuring that all compartment openings were sealed. Because the compartment was not sealed, fresh air entered the compartment, diluting the CO2 and rendering it ineffective at extinguishing the fire. A second charge of CO2 was available to the crew, but they were not aware of this because they had not received formal familiarization or training sessions on this equipment then. |
| Skalva (M06L0004) | Summary: On January 4, 2006, after the Skalva discharged a partial consignment of cargo at Gaspé, Quebec, work began on welding anchor rings for securing the remaining cargo of bundled construction lumber. During the welding process, smoke was seen rising from between the wood bundles. A dry chemical extinguisher and water were applied, but to no avail. The hatches were then closed and carbon dioxide was released into the hold. The temperature in the hold initially increased, but then a decreasing trend was recorded. Eight days later, with the hold at ambient temperature, the hatches were opened and the fire was found extinguished. |
| Safety concern: The response to a major vessel-related emergency may involve various agencies and organizations, ports and municipalities, each of which requires coordination and integration within the overall response. The Board is concerned that the continuing disparities of a planned and coordinated approach to emergencies, as demonstrated in this occurrence, will continue to jeopardize the effectiveness and the safety of the response. The Board will continue to monitor the situation with a view to assessing the need for further safety action. | |
| Silent Provider (M03M0077) | Summary: At about 1700 Atlantic daylight time, on June 25, 2003, the fishing vessel Silent Provider left Canso, Nova Scotia, in fair weather and visibility, and headed for Petit-de-Grat, Nova Scotia. Approximately one hour later, smoke was seen coming from the engine room doorway. The fixed halon fire smothering system in the engine room was discharged, but did not appear to bring the fire under control. The crew broadcast a Mayday, then deployed the rigid liferaft, an Ovatek 4, into the water. |
| Safety concern: Although it is the responsibility of the master to ensure, through drills and practices, that the crew is familiar with the specific fire-extinguishing system on board ship, many fishers, including masters, are not aware of the proper use of fixed smothering systems to combat engine room fires. The Board is concerned that the level of firefighting proficiency among fishers is less than adequate, and that the inherent risk of this inadequacy is detrimental to safety. | |
| Queen of Surrey (M03W0073) | Summary: On the morning of May 12, 2003, while en route in clear and calm conditions from Horseshoe Bay, British Columbia, to Langdale, British Columbia, with 318 passengers and 137 vehicles on board, the Queen of Surrey suffered a diesel oil fire on its No. 2 main engine. The engine room was evacuated and sealed, and carbon dioxide (CO2) gas was released into it. Although immediate failure of the CO2 distribution manifold allowed some of the gas to escape, enough reached the engine room to extinguish the fire. The vessel was then towed to the Langdale ferry terminal, where the passengers disembarked. There were no fatalities. |
Recommendation M05-05: The Department of Transport, in conjunction with other stakeholders, review Canadian and international marine regulations respecting fixed fire extinguishing systems to ensure that their design, maintenance, inspection, and testing regimes effectively demonstrate continued structural and functional integrity. (Closed, Fully Satisfactory) Recommendation M05-06: The Department of Transport require Canadian passenger vessels over 500 gross tonnage to meet a standard of structural fire protection that ensures a level of safety equivalent to SOLAS-compliant vessels. (Closed, Fully Satisfactory) | |
Safety concern: While the Board recognizes that Transport Canada (TC) has made significant progress in implementing a quality management system (QMS), there is concern that the quality of some inspections conducted by TC may not be attaining the prime objective of inspection; that is, to ensure that the system being inspected is in a safe operational condition at the time of the inspection. Safety concern: The investigation into this accident did not include an examination of the safety management system (SMS) on board other BCFC ferries. However, an investigation conducted by the TSB into an occurrence on board the ferry Bowen Queen (TSB report M02W0061) noted shortcomings in documenting repairs to critical equipment, which forms part of the company SMS. The Board is, therefore, concerned that the weaknesses and shortcomings on board the Queen of Surrey may not be confined only to this BCFC vessel. | |
| Windoc (M01C0054) | Summary: At approximately 2054, while proceeding downbound under Bridge 11 in the Welland Canal, at Allanburg, Ontario, the bulk carrier Windoc was struck by the bridge's vertical-lift span, which was lowered before the vessel had passed clear of the bridge structure. The vessel's wheelhouse and funnel were destroyed. The vessel drifted downstream, caught fire, and grounded approximately 800 metres from the bridge. Although the vessel's cargo of wheat was not damaged, the vessel was declared a constructive total loss. The bridge sustained structural damage, and the Welland Canal was closed to vessel traffic for two days. There were no serious injuries or oil pollution. |
| Recommendation M02-04: The Department of Transport ensure that overall preparedness is appropriate for responding to vessel-related emergencies within the Seaway. (Closed, Fully Satisfactory) | |
Safety concern: Without readily available fire plans, shore-based fire departments, whose knowledge of the shipboard environment may already be limited, do not have access to information on the disposition of the vessel's fire fighting equipment. The Board notes that Transport Canada is conducting a review of the Fire Detection and Extinguishing Equipment Regulations. However, the Board is concerned that, in the interim, without a requirement for such plans to be stored in a location outside the deckhouse on Canadian non-convention vessels, inaccessibility of the ship's fire control plans may continue to hinder the firefighting capability of municipal fire departments, thereby increasing the risk of personnel injury and damage to property. Safety concern: Examination of the sprinkler system on the Windoc subsequent to the occurrence indicated that pipework had been secured to wooden structures. Once the fire destroyed the wooden components of the accommodation, the unsupported sprinkler pipework collapsed, rendering it unserviceable. Subsequent to two fatal fires involving Canadian vessels in 1979 and 1981, many older Canadian flag vessels were retrofitted with such sprinkler systems throughout their accommodation structures. The Board is therefore concerned that, such other older vessels may have retrofitted sprinkler systems attached to combustible internal structures, in a manner similar to the Windoc, and that exposure of such systems to fires may negate their effectiveness. | |
| Southgate (M98L0139) | Summary: On October 26, 1998, early in the afternoon, a fire broke out in one hold of the Southgate. The vessel was moored alongside at Grande-Anse, Quebec, and the stevedores were loading medium-density fibreboard packaged in bundles. During loading operations, the general alarm sounded as the fire spread rapidly between the bundles. Unable to control the fire, the crew decided to isolate the cargo by closing the hatches and ventilation shafts, and injecting CO2, which is the safest and most effective extinguishing agent for hold fires. However, the hold was opened again the next morning. The physical and chemical action of the CO2 on the cargo and the ambient air lasted only about 19 hours. This length of time proved insufficient to cool and smother the blazes. When the cargo was exposed to the open air, the centres of fire were exposed to a sufficient amount of air to kindle the fire. |
| Petrolab (M97N0099) | Summary: On the evening of July 19, 1997 an explosion and fire occurred on board the tanker Petrolab while the crew was washing cargo oil tanks in preparation for loading cargo. The ship's owner was killed and three members of the crew, one of whom later died in hospital, were injured by the explosion. The ensuing on-board fire subsequently spread to the government wharf. The combined efforts of two Canadian Coast Guard vessels and several shore-based fire departments were required to bring the fire under control. As a precaution, the town of St. Barbe was partially evacuated. Both the ship and the government wharf were destroyed before the fire was fully extinguished some 63 hours later. No pollution was reported as a result of the fire. |
| Sha 122 (M97W0044) | Summary: The small fishing vessel Sha 122 was moored, second from the dock, in a row of four vessels at the floating dock on the east side of the jetty at Comox Small Craft Harbour. On the afternoon of March 23, 1997, the operator returned, after an absence of 48 hours, intending to sail from Comox to Prince Rupert, British Columbia. He boarded the vessel, opened the gasoline tank valves and went forward to start the engines. At 1730 he started the port engine and immediately there was an explosion followed by a large gasoline-fuelled fire. The force of the explosion ejected the operator from the Sha 122 and he landed on the deck of another vessel. Crews from other vessels at the dock began moving vessels and freeing the burning Sha 122 from the dock. The operator was treated overnight in a hospital and released. Sha 122 was extensively damaged, was cut in two during salvage operations, and was a constructive total loss. |
| Western Viking (M97W0194) | Summary: While the vessel was moored at the Chevron Dock in Ucluelet, British Columbia, a fire started in the accommodation of the Western Viking when an electrical cable, inside a false deckhead, shorted out and burned. The fire was reported by a local resident at approximately 2245 and the Ucluelet Volunteer Fire Department arrived on the scene within about 25 minutes. Despite their best efforts, and those of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, the fishing vessel's accommodation was severely damaged. The skipper, who had been sleeping in his cabin on the upper deck, was overcome by smoke and died in the fire. |
| Ambassador (M94M0057) | Summary: In the early morning hours of December 31, 1994, a fire broke out in the conveyor belt system of the Ambassador during the unloading of a cargo of rock phosphate. The fire subsequently spread to the vessel's accommodation, and the combined efforts of the ship's crew and several shore-based fire departments were required to bring the fire under control before it was fully extinguished, some 28 hours later. There was no damage to harbour installations, no serious injury and no reported pollution as a result of the fire. |
Recommendation M96-06: The Department of Transport conduct a special audit of fire-fighting facilities at Canadian ports and harbours under its jurisdiction to ensure that an adequate year-round capability exists to contain shipboard fires. (Closed, Satisfactory in Part) Recommendation M96-07: The Department of Transport, in collaboration with ports and harbour authorities, take measures to ensure that shore-based fire brigades expected to support on-board firefighting, receive appropriate training. (Closed, Satisfactory in Part) Recommendation M96-08: The Department of Transport take appropriate measures to ensure that on-board fire-fighting capabilities of vessels in Canadian ports and harbours are functional and readily available during cold weather operations. (Closed, Fully Satisfactory) |